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Lenders use rating and scoring models to rank credit applicants on
their expected performance. The models and approaches are numer-
ous. We explore the possibility that estimates generated by models
developed with data drawn solely from extended loans are less valu-
able than they should be because of selectivity bias. We investigate
the value of ￿reject inference￿￿methods that use a rejected applic-
ant￿ s characteristics, rather than loan performance data, in scoring
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1model development. In the course of making this investigation, we
also discuss the advantages of using parametric as well as nonpara-
metric modeling. These issues are discussed and illustrated in the
context of a simple stylized model.
JEL Classi￿cation: C13, C14, C52, G11, G32
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1 Introduction
Credit scoring models rate credit applications on the basis of current applic-
ation and past performance data. Typically, credit performance measures
and borrower characteristics are calculated as functions of the data for a
sample of borrowers. These measures are then used to develop statistical
scoring models, the output of which, scores, are forecasts of credit perform-
ance for borrowers with similar characteristics. For example, a model might
generate a predicted performance measure as a function of the applicant￿ s
utilization rate for existing credit lines. A lender will typically use this per-
formance predictor as part of a decision on whether or not to extend credit
in response to the application. A simple decision rule would be to accept the
application only if the estimated performance measure (say, the probability
of delinquency or default) is less than a critical value ￿. The appropriate
performance metric may vary across applications. A natural metric in the
stylized models we will discuss is default probability; although we found it
useful to reference ￿default probability￿throughout the paper, the discus-
sion holds for essentially any performance measure. A practical, though more
complicated approach, is to estimate a loan￿ s pro￿tability. We note that in
retail banking practice, it is more common than not to report performance
forecasts (scores) that increase in value as the probability of default decreases.
In contrast, corporate and other business rating and scoring models usually
report scores and grades that increase with the probability of default. In the
balance of this paper, we make use of the latter convention.
Discussions of credit scoring, including various approaches for di⁄erent
applications (mortgage lending, credit card lending, small commercial lend-
ing, etc.) are given by Thomas, Edelman and Crook (2002), Hand (1997),
Thomas, Crook, and Edelman (1996) (a collection of relevant articles) and
others. A recent review of the credit scoring problem including an insight-
2ful discussion of evaluating scoring mechanisms (scoring the score) is given
by Hand (2001). Early treatments of the scoring problem are Bierman and
Hausman (1970), and Dirickx and Wakeman (1976); this work has been fol-
lowed up by Srinivasan and Kim (1987) and others.
A critical issue in credit modeling is the relevance of the data on the
experience of loans extended to the potential experience of loans declined.
Can the relation between default and characteristics in the sample of loans
made be realistically extended to predicting the default probabilities for loans
not made? This problem is known as a ￿selectivity￿problem. A number of
methods based on ￿reject sampling￿have been proposed to try to use data
from rejected loan applications together with the experience of existing loans.
A related issue is the relevance of the experience with loans presently or
previously outstanding to current and future potential loans. Demographic
changes (an aging population) or a di⁄erent stage in the business cycle could
diminish the relevance of such experience.
The procedure we examine is essentially sequential, though the full im-
plications of the sequential updating process are not explored here. Loan
applications are accepted according to some rule, possibly stochastic. The
experience of these loans is recorded and used to estimate, or sharpen, ex-
isting estimates of default probabilities. Of course, repayment and default
information is available only on loans that were extended. However, data are
available on rejected loans, and we explore the potential for bias in using the
data only on accepted loans. We also address the possibility of using "reject
sampling" schemes to improve scoring models or default risk estimates. Our
simple framework abstracts from some di¢ cult practical problems (such as
what exactly default is; how to account for loans applied for, accepted by
the bank, and then declined by the applicant; and how default probabilities
change over the duration of a loan). Nevertheless, our focus on default as the
outcome of interest is a useful abstraction: in practice it may be appropriate
to study the expected pro￿t performance of a given loan application. This
involves the default probability, but adds other considerations, including for
example the pricing of the loan.
Throughout we emphasize a key conceptual distinction between two closely
related questions: Should the bank continue to make loans to applicants
with marginally acceptable characteristics? Should the bank extend loans
to applicants whose characteristics under current rules are marginally unac-
ceptable? There is data on the former question, as default probabilities can
be directly measured from experience with loan performances. Because the
3latter question cannot be answered using this conventional data, we must
turn to parametric assumptions or other methods by which to extrapolate
from the given sample. The only reliable way to answer the second question
is to use these parametric assumptions or collect additional information. We
suggest carrying out experiments with the scoring rule.
To sum up: We ￿rst cast some doubt on the likely importance of se-
lectivity bias in credit scoring; we consider reject inference and raise doubts
about its practical application; we consider advantages and possible disad-
vantages of parametric inference on default probabilities; and ￿nally we turn
to potential gains from experimentation with the credit-granting rule for the
purpose of generating information.
2 A Stylized Model
A simple model allows concentration on key conceptual issues. Suppose the
income from serving an account over a ￿xed period is ￿, the probability
of default is p, and the loss given default is ￿ (de￿ned here as a positive
number). Then the expected pro￿t from this account over the period (we
will return to the question of the period) is ￿(1￿p)￿￿p. In this case, loans
are pro￿table only if p 5 ￿=(￿ +￿). As a practical matter, banks often rank
applicants according to the estimated value of p and extend loans to those
applicants with the smallest default probabilities (as funds are available) up
to the critical value p￿ = ￿=(￿ + ￿). Of course, there is a lot missing in this
calculation, including the important question of estimation error in p and
how that might vary across applicants.
A minor variation on this calculation can get around the awkward ques-
tion of the de￿nition of the period. Let us reinterpret pro￿t as a rate of
income accrual, ￿￿. Assume the discount rate is r. Let T, a random vari-
able, be the time of default and suppose for simplicity that T is distributed
















￿=r + ￿)=(r + ￿): (2.2)
4Again, we get a cuto⁄rule, order the applicants in terms of a and extend loans
to those with the smallest values of ￿, up to the critical value. For a ￿xed
period, there is a monotone map between ￿ and p, the default probability in
the previous model.
The point of this exercise is not to exhibit a realistic model, but to il-
lustrate that the lesson from the simple model is fairly robust. Namely, the
optimal lending policy will involve ranking applicants according to a per-
formance measure and lending funds as available up to a cuto⁄ point. Note
that, as a practical matter, essentially all of the ￿￿xed￿parameters in the
simple model will vary across applicants and possibly over time according to
macroeconomic and local economic conditions.
3 Information and Identi￿cation
Suppose the application data consists of X. At present, X can be rather
abstract, perhaps a collection of numbers indicating ￿nancial history, discrete
or continuous variables, etc. On the basis of X, a decision is made whether
to approve a loan application. Let A be the variable indicating loan approval
(A = 1) or decline (A = 0). We partition X = (XA;XR) corresponding to
characteristics associated with approved and rejected loans. X is observed
in both cases.
Suppose the population relationship between default D (= 1 for default,
0 for no default) and data X is P(DjX). P(DjX) is thus the probability
of default given characteristics X in the population. The chain determining
events is
X ! (A;X) ! (D
￿A;A;X) = (DA;A;X) (3.1)
where the ￿nal state DA = D ￿ A consists of D if it is observed, that is if
A = 1, and no information on D if A = 0. D is partitioned (DA;DR) and
DR is not observed. Here X determines A and X is simply carried along as
a determinant of D. The ￿nal state DA is determined by A and X.
The key observation here is that the intermediate state, (A;X) contains
no information not already contained in X. A is determined as a (possibly
random) function of X. For example, X might be the predictor variables
in a default risk model and A might be chosen to equal 1 (accept the ap-
plication) if the predicted default probability is less than ￿. In this case,
A is a deterministic function of X. Alternatively, A could be completely
5random, determined, for example, by a coin ￿ ip. In the language of the stat-
istical literature on missing data, the mechanism determining A and hence
DR is missing at random (MAR); see Little and Rubin (2002) and Hand and
Henley (1994). The deterministic case, possibly relevant here, in which A is
determined by some function of X, is a special case of the MAR mechanism.
Since A contains no information not contained in X, inference on P(DjX)
does not depend on A. Of course, this inference can only be made for X con-
￿gurations actually observed. Which credit histories are observed depends
on X (and possibly a random mechanism), so there is no bias associated
with estimating those probabilities that are identi￿ed. To illustrate, suppose
X is binary and the deterministic selection rule takes only applications with
X = 1. In this case, no information on P(DjX = 0) will be generated,
though additional information on P(DjX = 1) will be. This illustrates the
di⁄erence between the two central questions: First, are loans being made
that shouldn￿ t be made (a question that can be answered using estimates of
P(DjX = 1))? Second, are loans that should be made not being made (a
question that must be answered using P(DjX = 0), on which there is no
data)1?
4 Hidden Variables and Selectivity
The potential for biases in using the accepted loan data only arises when
the selection mechanism proxies for omitted, but important, variables in the
default equation. To see this in our Markov setup, we augment the variables
by including the hidden variable U. Thus
(X;U) ! (A;X;U) ! (DA;A;X) (4.1)
If U was observed, the problem duplicates the previous one; if not, things be-
come more complicated. Speci￿cally, we would like to estimate P(DjX;A),
the conditional probability of default given characteristics, marginally with
respect to the hidden U, on the basis of our observed data, which are
P(DAjX;A). In the previous section, P(DjX) and P(DAjX;A) were the
same, because A carried no relevant information given X. In the present
1Note that P(AjX) can be estimated, and such an estimate might help an outside
examiner trying to determine, for example, whether an institutional loan policy satis￿es
various legal requirements. Nevertheless, it does not provide information on P(DjX).
6case, A might be relevant as a proxy for U. This is the case referred to as
not missing at random, NMAR.
This point can be made in the simpler context of inference on the marginal
probability of default. Thus we focus temporarily on the selection issue and
abstract that issue from the problem of inference on the e⁄ects of the X
variables. The chain becomes
U ! (A;U) ! (DA;A) (4.2)
and we wish to make inference on P(D) on the basis of the data, which are
informative on P(DA). Now, P(D) is the marginal probability of default in











(the second equality holds since A carries no new information given U). Here




unless A and U are independent. Hence using information on the accepted
loans to make inference about the population default probability leads to
bias.
The argument is easily extended to inference about the e⁄ects of charac-
teristics X on the conditional distribution P(DjX) using data generated by
the distribution P(DAjX;A = 1). If the hidden variable U a⁄ects D and A,
then A will proxy for the e⁄ect of U in P(DAjX;A = 1), leading to incorrect
inferences. Note that
P(DAjX;U;A = 1) = P(DjX;U); (4.6)
so A is irrelevant given U and X. Nevertheless
P(DAjX;A = 1) 6= P(DjX): (4.7)
7It is only through the interdependence of A and the missing hidden variable
U that bias arises.
What is the hidden variable U? This is not so clear. One obvious example
arises when a variable used in scoring, and relevant for predicting default,
does not enter the default probability model. It would be a clear mistake
to include a variable in the scoring model that was not in the default model
(although one could argue that not all variables in the default model need
appear in the scoring model); thus, we suspect that this is not a likely source
of bias.
The key is that the hidden variable must a⁄ect the decision to approve the
loan and the default probability. This variable can be observed by whoever
makes the lending decision but not by the default modeler. If loans are made
in person, for example, an experienced loan o¢ cer may be able to get a ￿feel￿
that the applicant is more (or less) reliable than the paper data indicates.
There may be many components to this ￿feel￿not re￿ ected in the application
data: promptness in showing up for appointments, openness vs. shiftiness,
vagueness or precision in answering questions. Such observations will a⁄ect
the loan decision and, if they are accurate, also the default probability. If
the variable is observed by the loan originator and used in the acceptance
decision, but is in fact not relevant to the default probability, there will be
no induced bias in using the default data on the accepted loans. Bias only
arises if the data is relevant, is available to the acceptance decision maker
and used, and is not available to the default modeler.
This bias cannot be corrected without adding information. One source of
information is a priori ￿parametric assumptions on the joint distribution of
A and D given X, P(A;DjX). If these assumptions are su¢ cient to allow
estimation of the parameters of the distribution given only the selected data,
then the bias can be corrected. This approach has led to a huge literature in
labor economics, beginning with Heckman (1976). Of course, a better source
of information is more data. Impractical in the labor economics applications
where the decisions are made by the same individual (the classical applica-
tion has D being wages or hours of work and A employment), it is feasible
when the institution determines A and the applicant determines D. Much
less restrictive assumptions can sometimes be used to bound the probabil-
ities (Manski (1995) gives an insightful treatment of this approach and the
identi￿cation question generally).
85 Reject Inference
Modelers typically employ ￿reject sampling￿ or ￿reject inference￿ because
they are concerned that potentially relevant information in the application
data for rejected loans ought to be used in the default model. In this sec-
tion we ask whether there is any relevant information in such data. The
answer is usually no. That is, in studying default probabilities conditional
on characteristics X, the relevant random variables generating information
about the probabilities of interest, are the default/nondefault records. The
additional X variables alone are not of great interest in studying defaults
(although they are of course informative on the scoring process, since the
associated dependent variable accept/reject is observed). Useful discussions
of reject sampling include Crook and Banasik (2004) and Hand and Henley
(1993, 1994).
Many reject sampling procedures assign values of the missing dependent
variable, default/non-default, for the rejected applications according to the
values of the X variables. This phase is referred to as ￿data augmentation.￿
These values then enter a secondary analysis as real data. But the new
default values are not random variables relevant to inference about defaults.
That is, they are not default data. They are functions (possibly stochastic)
of the existing default data. On a purely conceptual basis we have
(XA;DA) for accepted loans &
(XA;XR;DA;DR) = "augmented" data
XR for rejected loans %
(5.1)
We have not been speci￿c about how the DR, the default history for the
rejected loans, is constructed, but the details are irrelevant for the concept.
Namely, the augmented data do not contain any information not in the ori-
ginal data XA, DA and XR.
In this example, when the information content of the augmented data and
the original data is the same, a proper data analysis (taking account of the
singular conditional distribution of DA and DR in the augmented data set)
will get the same answers from either of the two data sets. If the augmented
data set is analyzed as though it were real data, the results will re￿ ect the
assignment DR. At the very least, the results will o⁄er false precision, as
illustrated below. If the assignment is arbitrary, the results may distort the
information in the actual data.
9Consider the simple example with X a single binary variable, and only
one realized value chosen for the loan. There is information about only one
of the default probabilities, corresponding to the chosen value of the X, not
about both. The fact that one of the probabilities is unidenti￿ed is telling.
If reject sampling produces a data set that purports to identify the other
probability, it is being identi￿ed with non-data information. Thus suppose
(XA;DA) for accepted loans &
XR for rejected loans ￿! (XA;XR;DA;DR) = "augmented" data
Non-data Information Z %
(5.2)
The non-data information Z consists of (in a common case) functional form
assumptions or other assumptions made by the rejection sample design. For
example, in our simple case the default probability corresponding to the value
of XR might just be assigned as, say, ￿. The result would be that an analysis
of the augmented data set, treating it as a real data set, would discover that
the default probability for the unselected value of XR is ￿. But would it be
sensible for a bank to base decisions on this kind of inference? The point is
that the information being recovered by an analysis of the augmented data is
generated by XA, XR, DA and Z. One should ask whether Z really deserves
equal weight with the data?
Here is a less obvious, and less arbitrary, example. Suppose, in the context
of our example with binary X, the acceptance decision is randomized so that
there are some loans with X = 1 and some with X = 0. Then there is data
information on both default probabilities. Suppose these are estimated from
the accepted data as ￿0 and ￿1, corresponding to X = 0 and X = 1. We
propose to assign default data (the dependent variable) to the XR, the sample
of application data from rejected loan applications. One way to do this would
simply be to assign ￿i as the value of the 0=1 variable DR corresponding to
XR = i. These non 0=1 dependent variables will pose problems for some
estimation methods, however. Another assignment method is simply to draw
DRi = 1 with probability ￿i and zero otherwise. Another method in use is to
assign, for each XR, ￿i observations to the sample of defaults and 1￿￿i to the
sample of non-defaults. Some methods multiply these fractions by a factor
generating integer numbers of additional observations. The point is that no
new information is contained in the augmented data set, though an analysis of
the augmented data as though it were real data seems to produce much more
precise parameter estimates than the accepted data alone. Here the non-data
10￿information￿Z is the assumption that defaults in the rejected sample look
exactly like their predicted values on the basis of the accepted sample. Thus,
bias is not introduced, but a false sense of precision is introduced.
Another common method of assignment is based on functional form as-
sumptions. For example, suppose X is a continuous scalar variable and the
dependence of the default probability on X is estimated by a logit model
using data from the sample of loans extended. Suppose only values of X
greater than a cuto⁄x￿ are selected. Then, the accepted sample has X > x￿
and the declined X 5 x￿. Under the assumption that the logit model holds
throughout the range of X in the population, predicted default probabilit-
ies or predicted defaults can be made for the declined sample on the basis
of information in the accepted sample. Adding these ￿observations￿to the
augmented data set will give seemingly more precise estimates of the same
parameters used to generate the new observations. This is merely a classic
example of double-counting.
Consider this e⁄ect in the case where the X are all the same, so the
default probability to be estimated is simply the marginal default probability.
Using the sample of n1 accepted loans, we estimate this probability by b p =
#defaults/(#defaults+#non-defaults) with sampling variance b p(1 ￿ b p)=n1.
Now consider augmenting the dataset with information from the n2 declined
loan applications. Assign defaults to these applications using one of the
methods described above (for example, for each new observation, assign b p
new defaults and 1 ￿ b p new non-defaults). Using the augmented sample, we
calculate a new estimate, b b p = # defaults in the augmented data/(n1 + n2).
Clearly b b p = b p, so our procedure has not introduced bias. (Assuming that
the acceptance mechanism is not informative about the default probability,
b p is a correct estimator for the default probability). However, the standard
calculation of the sampling variance of the estimator gives V (b b p) = b b p(1 ￿
b b p)=(n1+n2) = n1=(n1+n2) times V (b p). If the accepted and declined samples
are equal in size, the augmented data gives an estimator with one-half the
variance as the accepted sample. The ridiculousness of this procedure is
easily illustrated by a further extension. Suppose there are an additional
n3 people who did not apply. In this example, knowing the X for these
people (everyone has the same X), we apply the same procedure. This
leads to the new estimate b b b p = b b p = b p, but now with estimated variance
b b b p(1 ￿b b b p)=(n1 + n2 + n3). The opportunities for increased apparent precision
11here are endless . . .
6 Reject Inference: Mixture Models
Mixture models allow use of the XR data from rejected applications through
modeling assumptions on the joint distribution of the X characteristics and
defaults. That is, the rejected applications are certainly informative on the
distribution of X. If an assumption on the relationship between the mar-
ginal distribution of X and the conditional distribution of D given X can
be plausibly maintained, then the distribution of X can be informative on
defaults in the rejected sample. Note that this is a very strong assumption.
To see how this works, suppose the population consists of two groups; ￿de-
faulters￿and ￿non-defaulters,￿with population (unconditional) proportions
￿ and (1 ￿ ￿). The characteristics X data are generated in the population
according to the mixture model p(x) = ￿pd(x) + (1 ￿ ￿)pn(x), where pd
and pn are the marginal distributions of characteristics in the default and
non-default populations respectively.
The likelihood contribution of the ith observation from the accepted
sample is the joint probability of default and X for those who default, namely
￿pd(xi)), and the joint probability of non-default and X for those who do
not, (1 ￿ ￿)pn(xi)). The contribution of the jth observation from the reject
sample is the marginal probability of X, namely
p(xj) = ￿pd(xj) + (1 ￿ ￿)pn(xj); (6.1)
and the likelihood function is the product of the likelihood contributions
from both samples. A parametric model can be selected for each of the
pi distributions and these parameters can be estimated along with ￿. The
object of primary interest is the conditional probability of default given x,
and this is given by
P(DjX) = ￿pd(X)=(￿pd(X) + (1 ￿ ￿)pn(X)): (6.2)
Feelders (2000) gives an example in which pn and pd are two di⁄erent normal
distributions. In this example he ￿nds that the mixture approach (known
to be the correct model) improves on an approach based on ￿tting a logistic
regression using the complete data. Hand and Henley (1997) give an as-
sessment similar to ours; without new information, perhaps in the form of
functional form assumptions, reject inference is unlikely to be productive.
12To illustrate just how dependent this approach is on functional form as-
sumptions, note that the model can be estimated, and predicted default
probabilities calculated, without any data whatever on defaults! Closely re-
lated techniques go by the names cluster analysis and discriminant analysis.
How can the data on rejected applicants plausibly be used? The only
hope is to get measurements on some proxy for the dependent variable on
default experience. Here, external data such as credit bureau data may be
useful. If the bureau data are available, and the declined applicant shows
an additional credit line, then the payment performance on that credit line
could be used as a measure of the performance of the loan had it been ex-
tended. Of course, there are a number of assumptions that must be made
here. These are practical matters (Was the loan extended similar to the
loan that was declined, and do the loan terms a⁄ect the default behavior?
Is the bureau information comparable to the data on existing loans?), but
the possibility remains that data could be assembled on rejected applicants.
The requirement here is that payment performance be measured, albeit with
noise. It cannot simply be imputed.
7 Parametric Models
The X data used in default models typically contains continuous variables,
for example, ￿nancial ratios, as well as discrete variables. It is natural to
experiment with parameterized models, for the parsimonious description of
the e⁄ects of these variables. A common speci￿cation is the logit, in which
the log-odds follow the linear model ln(P(D = 1jx)=P(D = 0jx)) = x0￿,
where x is a vector consisting of values of the elements of X and ￿ is a
vector of coe¢ cients. This model can be ￿t to data on accepted loans. In
the absence of bias due to relevant hidden variables and subject to well-
known regularity conditions, the parameter ￿ will be consistently estimated.
Under the maintained assumption that the functional form of the relationship
between the characteristics X and the default probability is the same in the
accepted and declined samples, predicted values of the default probabilities
in the declined sample are appropriate estimates of the default probabilities
for those observations, and are appropriate for use as a scoring rule (or part
of a scoring rule).
If the selection has been completely at random (MCAR), so the X con-
￿guration in the declined sample is the same as the X con￿guration in the
13accepted sample, we are on ￿rm ground. However, if selection is on the basis
of a particular element of x being greater than x￿, say, then it is a matter of
assumption that the e⁄ect of x values less than x￿ satisfy the same relation to
default probabilities as x values greater than x￿. This issue is similar to our
example of the binary X used for selection. The default probability can be
estimated only for the value of X selected. Assigning a default probability
for the other value of X is a matter of assumption. Here, we are a little
better o⁄, though still relying on assumptions.
Economic relations being what they are, it is probably safe to assume
that the e⁄ects of x less than x￿, but near x￿, have the same e⁄ect (in
functional form) as those greater than x￿, particularly if the speci￿cation has
been rigorously checked within the sample and found to hold for all x greater
than x￿. Extending the prediction of default probabilities for values of x
well outside the range of experience is dangerous. However, the loss here is
small; the crucial thing is probably to sharpen prediction around the cuto⁄.
It doesn￿ t really matter whether a default probability is 0.6 or 0.7 if loans
will be approved only if the probability is less than 0.05.
8 Advantages of Parametric Modeling
Using a parametric model can lead to substantially more accurate measure-
ment and predictions if the model is adequate. It is useful to illustrate with
a brief example. Let the vector x take values in fx1;x2;:::;xKg = X. Here
each xj is a 1xq row vector with ￿rst element equal to 1 (so the model allows
a constant mean probability as a special case ￿this is good statistical prac-
tice) and q ￿ 1 additional elements with values of individual characteristics.
Consider the logistic regression model with default probability F i for the ith
observation (with characteristics xi equal to one of the xj)
F
i = F(x
i￿) = 1=(1 + exp(￿x
i￿)) (8.1)
1 ￿ F
i = 1=(1 + exp(x
i￿))
The parameter ￿ is a qx1 vector. The likelihood function is where L(￿) = Q
i
(F i)di(1 ￿ F i)1￿di where di = 1 if the ith observation defaulted and zero
otherwise. The log-likelihood is
l(￿) =
P
i di lnFi +
P
i(1 ￿ di)ln(1 ￿ Fi) (8.2)
14Now let Dk be the number of defaults at x = xk, and Fk the associated
probability F(xk￿) and Nk the number of observations i with xi = xk. Then
1(￿) =
P
k Dk lnFk +
P
k(Nk ￿ Dk)ln(1 ￿ Fk) (8.3)
















Use @Fk=@￿ = x0
k(1 ￿ Fk)Fk to get






kxk(1 ￿ Fk)Fk: (8.6)
Note that the negative inverse of this non-stochastic matrix is the approxim-
ate variance of the MLE.
Let the xk be ordered so that FK is the highest acceptable default prob-
ability (i.e., nearest the desired cuto⁄ value for the scoring rule). FK can be
non-parametrically estimated by F ^ K = DK=NK with approximate variance
F ^ K(1￿F ^ K)=NK. Speci￿cally, N
1=2
K (F ^ K ￿FK) ￿ N(0;FK(1￿FK)). Consider
the alternative estimator F ￿
K = F(xK^ ￿), where ^ ￿ is the MLE. Here, under the
additional assumption that Nk=N remains ￿xed, N1=2(F ￿
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The relevant variance comparison is between V=N and (1 ￿ FK)FK=Nk.
As an example we take X = f(1;1);(1;2);:::;(1;20)g = fx1;:::;x20g and
Fk = 1=(1 + exp(￿xk￿)). To focus attention on the essential parameter,
the second element of ￿, we break out the intercept and rede￿ne ￿ and
x as scalars, writing xk￿ = ￿ + ￿xk with ￿ = ￿6:5 and ￿ = 0:3. We
consider the accepted sample with x < 12. The cuto⁄ probability is 0.04
and we are interested for the moment in estimating F11 (the true value at
these parameters is 0.0392). With 1000 observations for each value of x, the
15standard error of the nonparametric estimator is 0.00613. The standard error
(V=N)1=2 is 0.00441. The precision of the estimated probability at X = 11
is clearly improved by using the information from other values of x and the
functional form information. For the nonparametric estimator to achieve the
same standard deviation would require a sample size at X = 11 of 1,932,
nearly double the actual. For comparison, if the data at X = 12 were also
available, with 1,000 additional observations, the forecast standard error of
F11 is reduced to 0.00316. If instead these additional 1,000 observations were
spread evenly between 1 and 11 (values of X) the standard error would be
0.0042. Thus, values at 12 (near but beyond the cuto⁄) are more informative
than additional values in the current sample range.
Parametric models also provide, by means of assumptions, a mechanism
for out-of-sample predictions. For example, it is of considerable interest in
our example to estimate F12. Should these loans be made? We can use the in
sample data non-parametrically to estimate F11 (perhaps these loans should
not be made) but not F12. On the other hand, the parametric model can be
simply extrapolated to provide an estimate of F12, though there is no data
available to test the accuracy of the ￿t at X = 12. Thus nonparametric ana-
lysis of loans made can be informative on which loans that were made should
not have been made. However, it cannot say anything about which loans
not made should have been made. This is a clear argument for (cautious)
parametric modeling.
9 Dangers of Parametric Modeling
Choosing the functional form is a di¢ cult but standard statistical prob-
lem. The usual tradeo⁄ between over-￿tting and parsimony arises. A model
that describes the sample exactly is nearly useless for prediction, as we ex-
pect there is noise in the default mechanism and a description of noise does
not extend outside the sample. On the other hand, too much concern for
parsimony will lead to forecasting the default probability by its mean. Not
necessarily bad, but clearly improvable.
A simple example can illustrate the e⁄ects of misspeci￿cation. The type
of misspeci￿cation that we have in mind arises in credit rating and scoring ap-
plications precisely because the true model￿ s performance varies for that sub-
population which has historically been excluded (rightly or wrongly) from the
bank￿ s clientele. Suppose the above logit model, with simple linear log-odds,
16has been obtained by a modeler after analyzing data on loans extended under
his bank￿ s historical data (which results in performance information for loans
with X values < 12).
Suppose that the process generating default probabilities has a quadratic
e⁄ect of x. That is, suppose that, the ￿true￿process is
Pr(D = 1jX = x) = (1 + expf￿￿ ￿ ￿x ￿ ￿x
2g)
￿1 (9.1)
where ￿ = ￿10, ￿ = 0:87 and ￿ = ￿0:025.
These values have been chosen so that most of the nonlinear e⁄ect shows
up out of the available sample (X < 12). This is consistent with our inter-
pretation of the missppeci￿cation of interest.
As we illustate below, it is reasonable to think that the quadratic term￿ s
in￿ uence on performance would go undetected by the scoring model developer
when only performance data on extended loans with X < 12 have been used
in development. While the estimators for ￿ and ￿ from the misspeci￿ed
model will be inconsistent, the main questions of interest relate to the pre-
dicted probabilities and the amount of error therein. Clearly, if the range of
historical sample performance available to the modeler regularly included X
values for which the nonlinear e⁄ect was signi￿cant, we would expect that
the true quadratic relationship would be detected.
To investigate the impact of misspeci￿cation, we examine a misspeci￿ed
model ￿t to data on X = 1;2;:::;11, and then predict F11 (which can be
consistently predicted using the sample data) and F12 (which cannot). We
￿rst report limiting, asymptotic results, by solving the likelihood equations
for the misspeci￿ed model (setting their expectation under the true model
equal to zero by choice of parameters of the misspeci￿ed model). For ￿ =
￿10, ￿ = 0:87 and ￿ = ￿0:025 we have ^ F11 = 0:033 and ^ F12 = 0:052. The
true values are F11 = 0:0306 and F12 = 0:0407. The range of actual and
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Figure 1: Actual and predicted default probabilities: Asymptotic
results.
Figure 2 o⁄ers a closer look at the predicted and actual default probab-
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Figure 2: Actual and predicted default probabilities: closeup;
asymptotic results.
At these probability levels, these are probably values that a bank inter-
ested in expanding its loan portfolio, and willing to take on additional risk
to do so, would be interested in forecasting accurately. That is, the bank
currently cutting o⁄ at 11 might be interested in adding loans to applicants
with X = 12 or X = 13. If the bank extends 100M$ in loans to a pool with
X = 12, it expects loss based on analysis of the existing sample of ^ F ￿
12100M$
= 5.2M$, but the actual expected loss is F12*100M$ = 4.07M$. Clearly,
there is substantial gain from accurate information about the out-of-sample
losses.
18In our example, in-sample parametric speci￿cation diagnostics will spot
this misspeci￿cation if the sample is large. Thus, an asymptotic study along
the above lines is feasible ￿the test is consistent. The question is, how large
is large?
To investigate this question we use Monte Carlo techniques to run a small
sampling experiment. We generate data from the quadratic logistic model
above, ￿t a linear logistic model, and calculate predicted probabilities. We
also calculate the likelihood ratio test for the linear vs. quadratic model
(asymptotically equivalent to the score test but probably preferable in smaller
samples). In fact, we see that the asymptotic results presented above can
be misleading. The simple linear model is most often not rejected against
the quadratic alternative within the X < 12 12 sample. Furthermore, the
within-sample ￿t is much better than the asymptotic result, and the out-of-
sample predictions are much worse. We use a model with a single, integer
X, with values lower than 12 accepted into the loan sample and used in
estimation. Of interest are the estimates of F11, to verify whether this as a
good cuto⁄ point, and F12, to ask whether additional loans could be made
without substantially increasing risk.
First, we consider the likelihood ratio tests for the linear vs. quadratic
models. We take 1,000 observations at each value of x, so each model is
estimated with 11,000 observations. This is certainly a small sample relative
to those seen in practice, but keep in mind we are using only one regressor
(typical models in use would use many more). It is our intent to illustrate
the general possibilities for poor sampling behavior rather than to analyze
a particular model in current use. We estimate the model 200 times and
calculate the predicted probabilities in-sample and out-of-sample as well as
the likelihood ratio test for the signi￿cance of the quadratic term. The mean
￿p-value￿is 0.296. If we test at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 nominal signi￿cance
levels we reject the linear model 33.5 percent, 23.5 percent, and 9.0 percent
of the time respectively. Thus, the wrong model would probably not be
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Figure 3: Actual and predicted default probabilities: sampling
results.
A closer look at the lower values of x shows that the within-sample ￿t is
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Figure 4: Actual and predicted default probabilities: closeup;
sampling results.
The asymptotic results on misspeci￿cation well characterize the sampling
behavior of the estimators in the misspeci￿ed model. Here the estimates of
F11 and F12 (recall the true values are 0.0306 and 0.0407) are 0.033 and 0.052.
Thus the barely out-of-sample loss is overestimated, perhaps discouraging
the bank from making good loans. The nonparametric estimators are F NP
11
= 0.030 and F NP
12 = 0.041. The former is feasible under our assumptions,
the latter is not, since no loans are extended for X = 12, but we include this
calculation to show the utility of additional, nonparametric information.
20Box plots showing the distribution of the errors in the predicted probab-
ilities are shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Forecast Errors of a Misspeci￿ed Logistic Model: Monte
Carlo Calculations (Misspeci￿ed Model Developed with X<12)
Note that, as expected, the prediction error is worse in terms of location
and has higher variance as we predict farther out of the sample.
These conclusions generalize naturally to other examples not considered
here. If we had considered and example where the non-linearity of the true
model became signi￿cant only at more extreme values of X (those much
greater than 12), it would be harder to detect, but it also would have less
impact upon the bank￿ s decisions at the margin of it￿ s business. On the other
hand, if we had considered an example where the nonlinear its occurred
deeper within range of data covered by historical sample, it would have been
easier to detect, and the issues of misspe￿cication, hopefully, moot.
In fact, there are a wide variety of model selection mechanisms. A talented
modeler, who will examine the ￿ts of various models, logit and others, with
di⁄erent transformations of the variables, is invaluable. Automatic methods
such as neural nets (a form of nonlinear regression) and other methods with
automatic variable selection rules can also lead to good models for in-sample
￿ts. However, note that a model selection procedure based upon pretesting
21logistic regressions may reduce, but not necessarily eliminate the type of
model selection errors we discuss.
10 Experimentation
The bank is interested in precisely estimating default probabilities that are
near the cuto⁄ in the selection rule. Lending at this margin can give a bank
its competitive edge. There are two issues: First, is the minimum acceptable
default probability (in our example, the one for applicants at F11) well meas-
ured, and should loans continue to be made to these applicants? Second,
should loans should be extended to the applicants considered marginally un-
acceptable ￿ in our example, the applicants at F12, and is F12￿ s probability
well forecast?
Note that the probabilities for F11 and F12 are estimated di⁄erently. There
is direct data information on F11; it can be estimated nonparametrically
as well as parametrically, and speci￿cation errors can be detected, though
this can be di¢ cult in practice, as we have seen. There is no direct data
information on F12. It is not nonparametrically identi￿ed and can only be
estimated with parametric assumptions.
Given the importance of correct measurement of these probabilities, the
bank can be expected to devote considerable resources to getting these right.
One way to devote resources to this e⁄ort is to make some loans at X = 12.
Suppose the same number of loan dollars are spread out from X = 1 through
12, instead of from X = 1 through 11. This will probably result in a riskier
portfolio, since it is suspected that loans at X = 12 are riskier than at
X < 12. On the other hand, it is unlikely that loans at X = 12 are much
riskier than at X = 11. Of course, the potential gain is that the improvement
in measurement of F12 will reveal that these loans are indeed acceptable to
the bank and should be made.
Note that the area of interest is the one around the cuto⁄ value. Large
changes in the selection rule are unlikely to be prudent. A good strategy
would be to collect information, make small changes, re-estimate, etc. This
suggests that loans at X = 12 should not simply be substituted for those
at X = 11; the X = 11 information is also critical to the measurement of
risk at the cuto⁄. On the other hand, shifting portfolio dollars from X = 11
to X = 12 loans is cheaper than other shifts; why reject loans that are
obviously pro￿table? We therefore consider this alternative strategy brie￿ y
22after reporting our analysis of the initial experiment.
We consider the strategy of adding loans at X = 12 by reducing the
level of loans evenly across all other values of X. First, we do the asymptotic
analysis. Here the sample size itself is irrelevant, though the even distribution
of X across its possible values does a⁄ect the results. The most relevant
probabilities areF P
11 = 0.0299 and F P
12 = 0.0454. Again, the true values are
0.0306 and 0.0407, so there is unambiguous improvement from adding this
information at X = 12 (recall that the previous sample predicted F12 =
0.052). The predicted and actual probabilities over the whole range are
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Figure 6: Performance of a Misspeci￿ed Logistic Model:
Asymptotic Calculations (Misspeci￿ed Model Developed with
X<13)
Next we turn to the sampling experiment. The total sample size for es-
timation remains the same, and we can directly compare the information
value of observations at X = 12 with that contained in the same number of
observations distributed across all other levels of X. We now have 917 obser-
vations for each value of X = 1;12. The resulting predicted probabilities F P
11
and F P
12 are 0.0301 and 0.0458 (recall the true values are 0.0306 and 0.0407)
Thus, the additional information from the X = 12 observations substituted
for some of the previous in-sample observations is indeed valuable, substan-
tially improving the measurement of these probabilities. The nonparametric
estimates are F NP
11 and F NP
12 = 0.031 and 0.041 respectively, now both feas-
ible and clearly providing valuable information. The p-value for the LR test
now has mean 0.20 and the linear model is rejected in favor of the quadratic
at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 nominal levels respectively 18.5 percent, 36 per-
cent, and 49 percent of the time. Note that the additional information has
23both sharpened the estimates of F11 and F12 and improved the power of the
speci￿cation test. The range of predicted and actual probabilities is show in






1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19
Actual Pred
Figure 7: Performance of a Misspeci￿ed Logistic Model: Monte
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Figure 8: A Close-Up View: Performance of a Misspeci￿ed
Logistic Model: Monte Carlo Calculations (Misspeci￿ed Model
Developed with X<13)
Once again the asymptotic results provide a good guide to the sampling
performance of the estimators in the misspeci￿ed model. The box plot for
the prediction errors is shown in Figure 9.
24Figure 9: Forecast Errors of a Misspeci￿ed Logistic Model: Monte
Carlo Calculations (Misspeci￿ed Model Developed with X<13)
As we have seen before, the prediction errors are worse as we move away
from the sampled values of characteristics X.
What is the cost of this experiment in terms of added loan portfolio
risk? The average loan default probability with the cuto⁄ at X < 12 was
estimated to be 0.0080 and the average probability with the cuto⁄at X < 13
was estimated at 0.0117 before the additional data were accumulated. With
the new estimates, the values are 0.0078 and 0.0110 respectively. The actual
risk values are 0.0082 and 0.0109. The actual di⁄erence in risk is less than
expected on the basis of either set of estimates, yet the addition is substantial.
An alternative experiment would continue to extend obviously good loans
to the extent possible and to substitute loans at X = 12 for those at X = 11.
The loans are substituted to keep the outstanding loan balance constant
and hence make a fair comparison of the information value of the portfolio
experience. Although X = 11 loans are informative of behavior around the
cuto⁄, and are therefore potentially important, the real key is the addition
of the X = 12 loans.
The asymptotic results give F P
11 and F P
12 as 0.0296 and 0.0449 (true 0.0306
and 0.0407) so there is clear improvement over the case in the X < 12 sample
and indeed even over the case of the X < 13 sample with an even distribution.
Thus, from this point of view, the addition of the new ￿extreme￿value X =
2512 made the X = 11 observations less relevant than the observations for
lower values of X. Of course, this point cannot be pushed too far; with no
observations at X = 11 there is no nonparametric information on the default
probability at that value.
Turning to the actual Monte Carlo results, we ￿nd thatF P
11 = 0.0296 and
F P
12 = 0.0452. These are quite good results as compared with the sample
from X < 12 and indeed the sample with X < 13 and spread observations.
Because the graphs of predicted and actual probabilities are similar to those
we have seen, they are omitted. Prediction errors get worse in terms of both
location and variance as predictions occur farther away from sampled values.
The likelihood ratio test shows improved performance. Rejections at the
nominal 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels are 53.5 percent, 40.0 percent, and 25.0
percent respectively. Thus the new, spread-out sample is informative about
speci￿cation error.
Finally, we compare the risk of the portfolio with loans at X < 12 with
the portfolio of loans at X < 13 and X = 11. The former we have calculated
as 0.0082 (actual); the latter is 0.0091 (actual), a reduction from 0.011 at
the spread-out sample. The less risky experiment is at least as informative
as the riskier and is therefore clearly preferable.
While it is always speculative to generalize from examples, this analysis
suggests that moving loans made near the current margin in the scoring cuto⁄
just across the margin to accumulate information may be a sensible strategy.
The information gain is considerable. The new information is particularly
relevant to picking up misspeci￿cation that could go unnoticed within the
current data range but which is important for assessing the performance of
a scoring rule.
11 Conclusions
This paper has emphasized key conceptual issues in the context of a stylized
model of estimation and decision making. The distinction between para-
metric and nonparametric identi￿cation is illustrated with examples. We
emphasize that there are two asymmetric questions one may ask of the data.
First, should some of the loans with performance measures near the critical
values not have been made? That is, should the critical value be adjusted so
that some of the loans currently being approved will not be approved in the
future. This question can be answered with data on current loans. Second,
26should some declined loan applications with estimated performance measures
near the critical value have been approved? This question is much more dif-
￿cult to answer, because one must use parametric assumptions if data comes
solely from current loans. We illustrate some of the di¢ culties involved here,
and emphasize the importance of in-sample speci￿cation checking. As a
practical matter, additional data is invaluable. We illustrate some advant-
ages of experimentation using loan applications with estimated performance
measures near critical values. Modelers may be able to design experiments
that, while not too costly in terms of portfolio performance, are extremely
informative about the optimal loan decision procedure.
To conclude on a practical note, the actual process is not designed de
novo, but is one in which procedures are changed (possibly even improved)
by collecting additional data. Modeling this activity as a dynamic process,
in which models are updated sequentially and experiments can be designed
sequentially according to the likely value of the additional data, is the subject
of a follow-up paper.
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